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ABSTRACT: It is widely assumed that the more certain and precise the scientific knowledge-base for 
predicting and understanding climate change, the better defined and robust will be the policy mea- 
sures undertaken in response. In t h ~ s  paper we argue to the contrary that in the case of Global Warm- 
ing Potentials (GWPs) ambiguity in their precise meaning is a major reason why they have been devel- 
oped and continue as scientific policy tools [although this is not how they are commonly represented in 
the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (LPCC)]. We survey and analyse the 
range of opinion on GWPs with respect to their scientific stability and comprehensiveness and argue 
that the utility of GWPs has to be evaluated in terms of their symbolic, interactional and heuristic effects 
as well as with respect to their direct instrumental uses. In addition, we argue that scientific discussion 
of GWPs commonly incorporates elements of the social and policy contexts of their application and pro- 
vide several examples from detailed discussions at the IPCC. We endeavour to account for the ambigu- 
ous identity of GWPs and draw out several implications from the findings of the paper for the construc- 
tion and use of scientific tools in policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION In this paper we explore one such tool for policy- 
the Global Warming Potential (GWP) index for com- 
The need for relatively simple scientific tools for pol- paring the climatic properties of different greenhouse 
icy in the climate change domain is widely recognised. gases (GHGs). Our analysis, however, challenges the 
This is because the scientific knowledge on climate assumptions of precision, clarity and technical robust- 
change is frequently complex with many different dis- ness in 3 ways. 
ciplines and issues involved, requiring synthesis, inte- 
gration and interpretation for the policy audience. It is 
usually assumed that to be effective such tools need to 
be precise, clearly defined, and technically robust in 
content. The policy actions that are proposed, partly on 
the basis of the scientific tool, are more likely to be 
widely accepted by all parties if the tool has the above 
characteristics, or so it is conventionally assumed. A 
robust tool provides policy actors with the confidence 
that it represents real processes sufficiently well for 
good policy analysis; a precise tool permits policy deci- 
sions to be precise also; and clarity allows the various 
assumptions and commitments behind the analysis, 
including those of the participating parties, to be ex- 
pressed in a transparent and open fashion. 
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The technical definition and content of GWPs is hotly 
debated amongst specialists, in terms of what vari- 
ables should be used to calculate the index and how. 
According to some scientists GWPs are not techni- 
cally robust. 
GWPs are not clearly defined but subject to mult~ple 
interpretations. Hence they are ambiguous rather 
than clearly defined or precise. 
Discussions over GWPs in policy contexts often incor- 
porate implicit policy and value judgements: hence 
GWPs can be characterised as 'hybrids' between sci- 
ence and policy, rather than being purely scientific in 
content, or incorporating explicit policy choices in a 
transparent way. 
Rather than perceiving these features to be a 'prob- 
lem', which stands in need of solution, we will argue 
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that they are an  almost inevitable component of scien- 
tific tools for policy and suggest why that may be the 
case. First, however, we should explain why we think 
the reader should be interested in our analysis. There 
has been considerable scientific and policy attention to 
GWPs over the last 6 or 7 yr, including discussions and 
controversies, workshops and IPCC deliberations. We 
know, therefore, that those in influential positions in 
the climate change science-policy dialogue believe 
there is something important about GWPs to discuss 
and argue over. It is fair to assume from the attention 
they have received that GWPs have also been reason- 
ably important to the way in which climate policy has 
been thought about and developed. We are also faced 
with some fascinating empirical facts: that very simple 
indices were being proposed for policy making even 
though millions of dollars have been spent on develop- 
ing much more complex policy-relevant science (cli- 
mate models for example); that the calculation of 
GWPs changed rather dramatically over very few 
years; that social scientists became involved in the 
debate and a struggle over what should be included in 
a greenhouse gas index emerged; that some scientists 
dismissed GWPs as b e ~ n g  over-simple or unrealistic; 
and so on. 
Our purpose is to shed some light on the debates 
over GWPs from a somewhat different perspective, 
that of the sociology of science. We are interested in 
the meanings given by scientists and policy makers to 
GWPs, why they thought about them in a particular 
way, how they related to the other concerns of those 
participants, and so on. But this is not just an exercise 
in academic sociology. There are also important impli- 
cations for how scientists and policy makers conceive 
of the role of climate science in policy, not just in the 
case of GWPs but more widely. The debates over 
GWPs concern much more than the development of 
an  instrument for producing numbers for optimal 
GHG-emission control policies. Other important un- 
anticipated effects have emerged from the develop- 
ment of GWPs, including the creation of a new com- 
munity for relating science and policy. Such social 
dimensions are not divorced from the way in which 
GWPs are constructed, presented and used, a finding 
which has important implications for the range of pol- 
icy options constdered, the ways of assessing alterna- 
tive policy choices, and the development of knowledge 
to assist policy. 
Our intention therefore is not to assess GWPs in a 
narrow sense, for example with respect to the criteria 
of precision, clarity and robustness, or vis-a-vis the pol- 
icy ambitions of the Framework Convention on Cli- 
mate Change (FCCC), or to suggest how they might 
better fulfil that role. To do so would require us to take 
our own position on what should be the goals of the 
FCCC given that they are presently unclear, and for 
ourselves to judge the scientific credibility of GWPs. 
We are more interested here in interpreting scientific 
debates about the credibility of GWPs, and in under- 
standing those arguments in their social and policy 
context, than in engaging in such a debate ourselves. 
Nor are we attempting to address a specific, highly 
focused 'problem', in large part because the real-life 
science and policy discussions do not present us with 
discrete, well-defined problems, but rather messy, 
ambiguous, changing and interrelated problems. What 
the 'problem' is changes depending on whom you 
speak to, where, when and in what circumstances. Our 
interest is in understanding how problems are defined 
by the scientists and policy makers themselves, and 
the implications of this for the development of climate 
change science and policy. We urgently need better 
understanding, interpretation and reflection upon the 
'wicked problems' which emerge from real world pol- 
icy debate if climate change science is to have more 
effective impact upon policy making. For convenience 
the key questions which guide the paper are listed 
below. 
(1) What features of GWPs have influenced their role 
as scientific tools for policy? And why? 
(2) What role do GWPs play in the provision of scien- 
tific advice for policy making? 
( 3 )  Are GWPs precisely and clearly defined, or 
ambiguous? 
(4) Are the positions taken, and debates over, GWPs 
only technical and scientific in character or do they 
also involve social and policy preferences and/or 
commitments, some of which are 'hidden' rather 
than deliberately chosen? 
(5) If social and policy elements are part of the debate 
over GWPs what are they? Where do they come 
from? And have they been openly debated or do 
they emerge by default? 
(6) What are the implications for the development of 
scientific tools for climate change policy making? 
In Section 2 we define GWPs and chart their devel- 
opment from 1990 to 1996, paying attention to the 
debates and controversies which GWPs have sparked 
off, and use a typology to characteri.se these. In 
Section 3 we argue that GWPs have an ambiguous 
meaning, and provide an interpretation of why this 
may well be helpful to their continued development 
and use. In Section 4 we turn our attention to the 
hybrid mixture of scientific, social and policy choices 
and commitments incorporated in discussions over 
GWPs. In the final section, we argue that GWPs may 
be unintentionally supporting certain approaches to 
climate policy analysis, especially a focus on green- 
house gas emissions, but that if GWPs were appraised 
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more realistically then other policy options might be- 
come more attractive. 
2. KEY DEBATES SURROUNDING GWPs 
The rationale for GWPs is that a range of gases con- 
tribute to anthropogenic climate change and that pol- 
icy under the FCCC to reduce emissions therefore 
requires: 'An index to compare the contribution of var- 
ious "greenhouse" gas emissions to global warming . .  . 
to develop cost-effective strategies for limiting this 
warming' (Lashof & Ahuja 1990: p 529). This 'compre- 
hensive approach' has been advocated strongly and 
developed by the US government from the late 1980s 
to the present day (and now by other governments) 
and is incorporated into the FCCC (United States 
Department of State 1989, Informal Seminar 1990, 
Stewart & Wiener 1990, Morgenstern 1991, Task Force 
1991). 
2.1. GWPs as  scientific tools for policy 
To go beyond the early focus of analysis and policy 
on CO2 required a metric for comparing the properties 
of different GHGs. They all have varying emissions 
and atmospheric concentrations, radiative forcing 
properties per molecule, and life-times so that to com- 
pare their greenhouse effects requires a method for 
taking these differences into account. GHGs with a rel- 
atively large radiative forcing but short life-time, such 
as methane, diminish in importance as contributors to 
the enhanced greenhouse effect as the time horizon for 
the calculation of effects increases, whilst COz, with a 
relatively small radiative forcing but long life-time, 
increases in relative significance. An important further 
complication is that some GHGs and non-GHGs have 
indirect effects, whereby a particular gas influences 
the concentration or life-time of another gas (or even of 
itself, in the case of methane) and,  therefore, its GWP. 
In principle, it should have been possible to use 
complex climate models, such as General Circulation 
Models (GCMs), to assess the relative contributions to 
radiative forcing and warming of different scenarios 
of GHGs after a given time period. In practice, how- 
ever, this use of GCMs as a comparative tool went far 
beyond the technical and scientific capabilities and 
resources then (or now) available. An important prece- 
dent in developing a simple model was the comparison 
of different ozone depleting chemicals using Ozone 
Depletion Potentials (ODPs). In the late 1980s / early 
1990s, a similar approach was adopted in the develop- 
ment of GWPs for each GHG (Lashof & Ahuja 1990, 
Derwent 1990, Rodhe 1990). Much of this analysis 
was motivated by the need for such an  index in the 
1990 report of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change),  reflecting the US government's 
commitment to the comprehensive approach. In 1990, 
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where 'a, is the instantaneous radiative forcing due  to a 
unit increase in the concentration of trace gas,  1, c, is 
concentration of the trace gas, i, remaining at time, t, 
after its release and n is the number of years over 
which the calculation is performed. The corresponding 
values for carbon dioxide are  in the denominator' 
(IPCC 1990: p 58). The numerical value of GWPs is 
dependent on the time horizon used in their calcula- 
tion. So, for example, a s  one advisory scientist to the 
IPCC has put it, if a long time horizon is used: 
relatively short lived and powerful greenhouse gases 
(such as the HFCs) can appear unimportant, even though 
unrestrained growth in emissions could make the gases 
significant contributors to total forcing. A short horizon 
would, however, make a less powerful but long-lived gas 
(N,O is an example) look unimportant. 
In its 1990 assessment the IPCC used 3 periods over 
which to calculate GWPs, 20, 100 and 500 yr, noting 
that: 'These 3 different time horizons are presented as 
cand~da tes  for discussion and should not be considered 
a s  having any special significance' (IPCC 1990: p 59). 
Flexibility, adaptability, economy and 'do-ability' a re  
the apparent advantages of GWPs over more complex 
models-for example in readily matching possible 
measures to policy objectives by illustrating how emis- 
sions of GHGs differ, on a common scale, in their 
short-, medium- and  long-term warming propensities.' 
This instrumental use of GWPs as tools for policy to 
help implement the comprehensive approach is not the 
only way to understand their rationale. As one scientist 
noted, GWPs were developed: 
'I t  may be asked why simple, l-dimensional climate models 
were not preferred over (;WPs. In fact Wigley & Reeves 
(1991) did apparently provide some such results. That GWPs 
were preferred is probably accounted for by the fact that it is 
widely questioned whether such l - D  models could capture 
the spatially-dependent interaction between atmospheric 
chemistry and dynamics. Hence their greater complexity 
might not have been perceived as an advantage over GWPs 
(in terms of providing reliable additional information). Sim- 
ple climate models are also only simple relative to GCMs. As 
a tool for policy, they are still rather complex and require the 
active involvement of the modelling team 
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with a very simple requirement tvhich was to give policy 
makers an idea oi the sorts of gases which could con- 
tribute to global warming. It's really as simple as that. To 
show them that i t  wasn't just CO,. 
(interv~ew with S.S., atmospheric chemist, 5 April 1993) 
Despite the above provisos, the IPCC provided a 
table of figures giving the direct and indirect GWPs for 
a wide range of greenhouse gases (CO2, a range of 
CFCs and HCFCs, CH,, CO, NMHC, NO, and NzO) 
over 3 time horizons-20, 100 and 500 yr. Error bars 
This we  term a symbolic role. GWPs were addition- were not given. 
ally advocated by some advisory scientists because 
they allowed policy makers, especially those from 
countries with a less well-developed scientific infra- 2.3. GWPs in the IPCC 1992 report 
structure, to use this method (whereas use of some- 
thing more complex would have been confined to just In its 1992 report the IPCC refrained from providing 
a few countries). quantitative values for indirect GWPs, stating that: 'it is 
not possible to quantify accurately the indirect GWPs. 
They've [GWPs] allowed a lot of countries to look at the 
policy within their own country context than would have 
been possible if we had been limited to providing people 
access to, say, leading-edge GCMs, or perhaps to one of 
these medium level assessment models like IMAGE. 
..other countries can't get in even to that level of model- 
ling technology. So, yes, I think GWPs have been very 
important in allowing policy makers to grab hold of a 
model that they could use t h e m ~ e l v e s . ~  
(interv~ew wj.th S.S., atmospheric chemist, 5 April 1993) 
Because it relates to the emergence of a research 
and policy community concerned with climate change 
issues we call this an interactional role. The scientific 
tool becomes a way of facilitating involvement from 
scientists and policy makers not otherwise part of that 
community. 
2.2. GWPs in the IPCC 1990 report 
GWPs were presented to the policy world by the 
IPCC in its 1990 report as fairly reliable and resilient 
tools. Uncertainties in the methodology were acknowl- 
edged (though not quantified) and the preliminary sta- 
tus of the quantitative values made clear. For example, 
lead authors of the relevant IPCC chapter noted that: 
..the indirect GWPs reported in IPCC (1990) are likely 
to be in error and should not be used' (IPCC 1992: 
p 55). The statement in 1992 that 'we can estimate the 
sign most likely for [the indirect effects of] some com- 
pounds based on current understanding' (ibid.) is a far 
cry from IPCC9O. Furthermore, the table of GWPs in 
IPCC92 appeared with a number of disconcerting 
warnings, such as: 'The lifetimes of the various species 
are not as precisely known as the Table suggests' and 
'The indirect GWPs are uncertain but could conceiv- 
ably be comparable in magnitude to the direct GWPs' 
(IPCC 1992: Table A2.1, p 56). 
One of the most dramatic changes was in the calcu- 
lation of the GWP for the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). 
In the 1990 assessment these were stated to collec- 
tively account for 24 % of the current contribution of 
GHGs to potential global warming. In the 1992 report, 
the CFCs were considered not to have any warming 
potential, because of their effect in depleting another 
GHG, namely ozone in the lower stratosphere, the 2 
effects cancelling each other out. 
In IPCC92 there was a more complete discussion 
than in IPCC9O of the methods involved in calculating 
GWPs and their accompanying uncertainties and 
assumptions (IPCC 1992: p 54-55). It was stated that 
GWPs can only be provided for well-mixed, long-lived 
gases which absorb long-wave radiation, and not for 
It must be stressed that there is no universally accepted 
methodology for combining all the relevant factors into a 
single global warming potential for greenhouse gas 
emissions. In fact there may be no single approach which 
will represent the needs of policy makers. . I t  must be 
stressed that these indirect effects are highly model 
dependent and they will need further revision and evalu- 
ation. 
(Shine et al. 1990: p 58, 60) 
species which absorb in short-wave radiation bands 
(such as aerosols). Calculation of GWPs cannot take 
account of latitudinal, and seasonal variations, nor of 
short-lived gases such as CO, non-methane hydro- 
carbons (NMHCs) or NO,. In IPCC92 the same time 
horizons are used as in IPCC9O and the somewhat 
stronger claim is made that: 'It is believed that these 
three time horizons provide a pract~cal range for policy 
applications' (IPCC 1992: p 54). 
It was also noted in IPCC92 that GWPs measure sur- 
'This rationale is also ment~oned by one of the developers of face-troposphere radiative forcing, not surface warm- 
an alternative Index, the World Resource Institute's Green- Ing (the response to forcing), climate models can be 
house Index, who noted that: 'A goal of the index was to 
make it simple for nations to assess their relative rank and used to predict warming from forcing, but such an 
progress in a simple manner without needing elaborate corn- exercise 'must be approached with caution' (IPCC 
puter models' (pers. comm. 27 November 1995) 1992: p 54). And it was also observed that: 'although 
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the GWP of a well-mixed gas can be regarded as a 
first-order indicator of the potential global mean tem- 
perature change due to that gas relative to CO,, it is 
inappropriate for predicting or interpreting regional 
climate responses' (ibid.). In summary, a shift to scepti- 
cism occurred in 1992 given recognition of the com- 
plexity of the scientific issues. 
There are potential credibility problems for GWPs in 
this shift of perceptions over just a few years. The 
repercussions were felt, for example, in hearings of the 
US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Re- 
sources in May 1992. Senator Wallop questioned 
whether the IPCC was disingenuous in stating in its 
1992 report that: 'Findings of scientific research since 
1990 do not affect our fundamental understanding of 
the science of the greenhouse', given the change in 
opinion on the role of CFCs (MacCracken 1992). 
Meanwhile, the press in the United Kingdom picked 
up on the same issue at a press-briefing. The following 
headlines appeared in the UK press on the 20th 
December 1991: 'Has it been a waste of time getting 
rid of our aerosols?', 'Doomsday is delayed as scientists 
blow hot and cold on the ozone layer' (Today 20/12/91), 
'UN environmentalists find silver lining in cloud of 
CFCs' (Daily Telegraph 20/12/91); and 'CFC global 
warming role in doubt' (Guardian 20/12/91). The 
Chairman of the IPCC, Professor Bert Bolin, reported 
verbally at an IPCC meeting in Bath (UK) in 1993 that 
the IPCC92's presentation of GWPs had caused a lot of 
anxiety amongst policy makers because it implied that 
GWPs were not very useful. 
2.4. GWPs in the IPCC 1994 report 
One of the most important issues for Working Group I 
(WGI) of the IPCC (which IS responsible for assessment 
of scientific processes) following publication of its sup- 
plementary report in 1992 was to decide what to do 
about GWPs. A common opinion at the Bath WGI meet- 
ing (coded here WGI 93) was that the 1990 report had 
oversold the idea of GWPs, but that the 1992 report had 
gone too far the other way and that the balance now had 
to be readjusted. The IPCC's report Radiative Forcing of 
Climate Change (IPCC 1995) sought to re-establish the 
credibility of the GWP. It contains a highly detailed 
account of GWPs, their assumptions, and of the diverse 
scientific knowledge behind them, and defines that 
group of gases for which it is worth calculating direct and 
indirect GWPs. For example, unlike what was done in 
1992, the direct and indirect effects of methane are 
calculated. The 1992 decision to omit calculating GWPs 
for NO,, CO and NMHCs is sustained because of a lack 
of knowledge: 'This does not imply that they are not 
significant for radiative forcing' (IPCC 1994: p 224). 
Meanwhile, the 1992 opinion that the indirect effects 
of CFCs would cancel out their direct effects was mod- 
ifled in 1994. The new position was that the GWPs for 
CFCs, HCFCs, and HFCs could conceivably be posi- 
tive or negative, and that the uncertainties arising from 
altitudinal and latitudinal dependence of the indirect 
effects prevented any more definite calculation. Also, 
in IPCC94 there is a reasonably lengthy discussion of 
the role of policy decisions in calculating GWPs. 
2.5. Some critical issues surrounding changing 
presentations of GWPs 
2.5.1. Arbitrary time horizons? 
IPCC9O suggested that if sea-level rise is the impacts 
issue of interest then a 100 yr time horizon is appropri- 
ate, whilst if it is precipitation then a 20 yr horizon is 
more suitable. And in 1994, the IPCC noted that: 
'GWPs with differing time horizons can aid in estab- 
lishing such a mix [of emphases given the type of effect 
w ~ t h  which one is concerned]' (IPCC 1994: p 229). 
Although not mentioned in IPCC reports, variable 
time-horizons might also be required for the same cat- 
egory of impact because of local and regional condi- 
tions and differential sensitivities, including the effects 
of natural and social variability and past damage due 
to climate change and other factors (acidification, other 
forms of pollution, ozone depletion, and so on). 
A policy framework using GWPs is therefore faced 
with the problem of either using variable 'customised' 
time horizons or of producing an 'average' time hori- 
zon (taking account of the differential impacts upon 
systems at different times). The use of multiple, cus- 
tomised time-horizons is problematic because it ques- 
tions the global definition of climate change as a single 
policy problem, weakening the rationale for a global 
agreement on GHG emission reductions (seen as 
necessary given the geographical divorce between 
sources of GHGs and climate change impacts) (Brown 
& Adger 1993). And as Fuglestvedt & Skodvin (1996) 
polnt out, multiple time-horizons compromise the com- 
parability of different gases, the whole point of the 
exercise! The apparent flexibility of GWPs in allowing 
the policy maker to choose the most appropriate time- 
horizon is then revealed as rather illusory." 
3 H o ~  would an average time horizon be chosen? Should it be 
nationally specific, or a global average? If different national 
averages were used, this would allow greater opportunity for 
pol~t~cal  manipulation of national analyses It might also, 
paradoxically, give more weight to impacts from countries 
with a disproportionately large share of GHG emissions. Us- 
ing a globally averaged time-horizon might also risk entering 
a 'zero sum game', as what one country gained from a chosen 
time-horizon, another lost (Fuglestvedt & Skodvin 1996) 
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2.5.2. Discount rates 
Some economists have argued that instead of using 
variable time-horizons GWPs should include a dis- 
count rate factor to take account of the extent to which 
damage in the present is more valued by society than 
at some point in the future. By contrast, the IPCC's 
GWPs give equal weight to all included climate effects 
up to some time horizon, T, and zero weight thereafter. 
Wallis & Lucas (1994) comment that: 
This is unfortunate because there is no objective way of 
setting time-horizon T ... there is no way to avoid implicit 
weighting between gases and between human genera- 
tions. Implicit in the IPCC choice are certain value judge- 
ments that put the GWP function into the ambit of soci.al 
science 
(Wallis & Lucas 1994, see also Wallis 1994) 
In fact, Lashof & Ahuja's original paper of 1990 had 
used a n  exponential discount rate with the horizon 
extended to infinity. This is hardly more convincing to 
many analysts, however, because it does not take 
account of the non-linearity between temperature 
change and climate change impacts and costs. As Eck- 
aus put it: 'it cannot be presumed that the economic 
evaluations of radiative forcing in successive penods 
will decline at  exactly the discount rate' (1992: p 27) 
(also, Wuebbles & Edmonds 1991, Reilly 1992, Reilly & 
Richards 1993). In other words, emissions of a short- 
lived gas relative to CO2 might not be  so important at 
time, t , ,  as at time t 2 ,  where t2 falls in a period when 
the impacts of, and damage from, a given rate of tem- 
perature increase are greater than at t l  because of the 
non-linear relationship between temperature and cli- 
mate impacts (Kandlikar 1995, Hammitt et al. 1996). 
Furthermore, even though there is a well-developed 
economic literature on discount rates, the choice of a 
discount rate for the case of future climate change is 
still arbitrary, and the final result will be very sensitive 
to the particular rate chosen (Kandlikar 1995). 
Hammitt et al. (1996) conslder the situa.tion in which 
climate-induced damages depend only on the maxi- 
mum global annual-mean surface temperature reach- 
ed. Again, incremental emissions of CH, will have 
negligible effects compared with emissions from a rel- 
atively long-lived gas such as COz, if the emissions 
take place far enough before the year in which the 
mean temperature peaks. For this reason, Kandlikar, 
Hammitt et al., and other analysts argue that an index 
has to incorporate different GHG emissi.on scenarios. 
Kandlikar notes that otherwise there is a danger that 
GWPs would promote reduction of short-lived GHGs 
in the near future as a more effective policy response 
than is in reality the case. Reilly also argues that GHGs 
have non-greenhouse-related properties which should 
be counted as credits (e.g. CO2 fertilisation of crops) or 
debts (e.g. CFCs depleting 03) (Reilly 1992), this being 
the logical extension of the comprehensive approach 
according to its advocates (Stewart & Wiener 1992, 
Wiener 1995). Wallis & Lucas (1994) also point out that 
GWPs do not take account of the rate of change of forc- 
ing, even though this is a key policy-relevant variable 
(cf. Handel 1991). Whilst this limitation is recognised in 
IPCC94, the IPCCSO and the World Meteorological 
Organisation (WMO 1992) also suggest that GWPs can 
be used to explore the rate of change of temperature, 
sea-level rise, and so on, in the context of providing 
advice to policy (through the choice of time horizon). 
Note that the above analysts refer to the effects and 
impacts of climate change caused by different GHGs. 
Hence they convert radiative forcing of GWPs into sur- 
face temperature change (by use of a climate model) 
and then use an algorithm for relating temperature 
change to damages (of a quadratic, linear, logarithmic 
form, etc.). The further down-stream effects (see Fig. 1) 
are also included in some formulations by calculating 
the economic damages of those impacts with an  eco- 
nomic model. 
2.6. A typology for understanding debates over 
GWPs 
The perceived stability of GWPs is one of the main 
points of disagreement in the debates around their 
usefulness. By perceived stability is meant the degree 
to which GWPs are perceived as scientifically certain 
and robust (with respect to the separate data selected 
and used and the method by which information is 
aggregated). A second key point of contention is the 
perceived comprehensiveness of the index, that is the 
extent to which it includes all the factors and variables 
held to be relevant in comparing the greenhouse prop- 
erties of different GHGs (as shown in Fig. 1). A green- 
house index can be made more comprehensive by 
virtue of including more of the down-stream variables 
in the chain from physical effects, to effects upon bio- 
physical systems, to impacts upon human systems. 
These 2 dimensions are depicted in Fig. 2 in which 
we have also mapped out the change in relative posi- 
tion of GWPs from 1990 to 1994 as well as the range of 
opinion on where GWPs should be located in the 
future. As indicated in Fig. 2, the IPCC has a consis- 
tently narrow view of GWPs as based on an up-stream 
physical formulation (radiative forcing). Not all climate 
scientists have agreed with the IPCC's judgement that 
GWPs are stable. A workshop held in 1990 identified 
many of the key scientific issues, assumptions and 
uncertainties surrounding GWPs (Workshop 1991). 
Harvey, for example, concluded that: 'Given the enor- 
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damage index 
(Hammitt et al. 1996) 
views see e .g .  Enting & Rodhe 1991, 
Caldeira & Ka.sting 1993, Wuebbles et  al. 
1995). The majority of social science and 
policy analysis commentators also argue 
that the IPCC's index is currently rather 
unstable, not because of its natural sci- 
ence component, but rather because it 
does not include 'down-stream' social and 
economic variables. A group of econo- 
mists and climate scientists at the Massa- 
chusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
combined forces in prepanng a brief note 
on why GWPs were inadequate in terms 
of atmospheric chemistry, economics and 
the needs of policy (Joint Program, no 
F l g  1. T h e  cha in  f rom physical  effects to  socio-economic impacts date). 
Since the more comprehensive index 
would indeed seem to be  more policy rel- 
mous uncertainties in the calculation of GWPs and evant, why has the IPCC not developed the index in 
their dependence on future scenarios, it is difficult to that way? When asked about the inclusion of economic 
see how they could be used in any rigorous way for factors into GWPs, several IPCC scientists responded 
policy analysis' (Harvey 1993: p 29; for other specialist that GWPs were already confusing, complicated and  
STABLE 
Fig. 2. TWO dimensions of the  debates 
sur round ing  GWPs 






Thls version of GWPs seen as 
unstable by Wallis. Lucas, Reilly. 
H a ~ e y  etc 
H a ~ e y  Reilly Hammitt W~ener 








Clim Res 8: 89-106, 1997 
uncertain enough without introducing a new level of 
complexity.' One interpretation of this response is that 
the advisory scientists consider the increased compre- 
hensiveness to come at the cost of greater uncertainty 
and instability in the index, even if the narrower index 
is less directly comprehensible or meaningful in a 
social or economic sense (in terms of Fig. 2 ,  the per- 
ceived comprehensiveness scale would slope down- 
wards the further it move to the right). Such instability, 
and loss of precision (and intellectual control) which 
would accompany an increase in scope, appears to 
have been considered by these IPCC scientists to dam- 
age the authority of the index in policy contexts. Hence 
the preference for the more restricted, but also more 
certain, up-stream physical definition of GWP (i.e. 
there is an implicit trade-off between potential 'useful- 
ness' in policy contexts and certainty: the more poten- 
tially policy useful, the less certain the knowledge). 
This judgement of scientists has been criticised by 
Eckaus who notes that: 'There is no easy way out of 
confronting the cost to society of reducing radiative 
forcing. Certainly, it would never be suggested that, 
because of the necessity of 'keeping the argument sim- 
ple', basic features of atmospheric chemistry should be 
passed over' (1992: p 34). 
In this section we have seen that there is a lively 
debate amongst specialists concerning the technical 
construction of a GWP-type index. We have also noted 
3 different roles for GWPs as scientific tools for policy. 
The instrumental role refers to the direct use of the 
GWP numbers in policy making; the symbolic role to 
the function of illustrating that more than CO2 is 
involved in causing anthropogenic climate change; 
and the interactional role to the attempt to involve fur- 
ther scientists and policy makers in climate change 
issues from countnes without strong modelling capa- 
bilities. 
3. AMBIGUITY IN SCIENCE FOR POLICY AND ITS 
POSSIBLE ROLE 
Even amongst natural scientists who accept the 
IPCC's narrow definition of GWPs, there are a range of 
views on the precise calculation of GWPs. From sur- 
veying the literature we have identified 8 technical 
issues upon which there are differing opinions 
amongst climate scientists. We call these cases where 
4The text in IPCC94 explicitly mentions discount~ng a.p- 
proaches but then notes: 'The possibility of coupling such 
factors to the GWP definition requires detailed study of eco- 
nomics and policy impl~cations, together with the require- 
ment for scientific accuracy, and is beyond the scope of the 
present review' (IPCC 1994. p 216) 
there is no single, or clearly 'correct', answer examples 
of ambiguity. There is: 
(1) Ambiguity as concerns the choice of GHGs for 
which GWPs are calculated (raising questions over 
the implications of spatial and temporal variability). 
(2) Ambiguity as concerns whether, and how, indirect 
effects are included in the calculation of GWPs. 
(3) Ambiguity in the time horizons for which GWPs are 
calculated. Or ambiguity in the discount rates 
chosen. 
(4) Ambiguity in the parameter of climate change 
which is being measured in the GWP calculation. 
(5) Ambiguity in the atmospheric residence time cho- 
sen for CO,. 
(6) Ambiguity in whether the GWPs are calculated 
using sustained emissions of GHGs or a pulse emis- 
sion. 
(7) Ambiguity over whether GWPs can be used to 
assess the rate of change in systems affected by cli- 
mate change. 
(8) Ambiguity over whether GWPs can stand alone in 
policy analysis or require further added-on scientific 
tools (such as climate models) before they are useful. 
3.1. Some evidence of ambiguity 
We do not intend to discuss all the above sources of 
ambiguity in detail. For illustrative purposes only, we 
will expand on the fourth type of ambiguity. The IPCC 
has in several places carefully defined GWPs as mea- 
suring the radiative forcing of GHGs, not the climate 
response (such as temperature). Yet, the rationale for 
GWPs in the Policymakers Summary of IPCC9O stated 
that: 'To evaluate possible policy options, it is useful to 
know the relative radiative effect (and, hence, poten- 
tial climate effect) of equal emissions of each of the 
greenhouse gases' (IPCC 1990: p xix). The statement in 
brackets implied that the relative potential climatic 
effect of GHGs was indicated by GWPs. 
One of the earliest research papers to calculate 
GWPs referred directly to the temperature response 
(Derwent 1990). The author recalls that the use of 
response i.n the calculation did not cause any problems 
at a WGI meeting at Crowthorne (UK) in preparation of 
IPCC9O (Derwent pers. comm. July 1996). Several cli- 
mate modellers involved in IPCC then believed in a 
simple linear relationship between forcing and tem- 
perature rise for the equilibrium case. Soon after that, 
the first major transient runs of GCMs questioned the 
realism of equilibrium studies, making the relationship 
between forcing and temperature unclear (ibid.). 
The IPCC 1992 report made clear the distinction 
between forcing and response, noted that GWPs could 
be regarded as a first-order indication of global, but 
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not regional, response, and also cautioned against any 
simple translation of forcing into response. The IPCC 
attempted to set the record straight in its 1994 report: 
Further, the GLVP as defined here is only a measure of 
relative r a d ~ a t ~ v e  forcing, not a measul-e of potent~al 
damage result~ng from possible climate change that 
includes economic or other variables. These limitations 
should be kept in m ~ n d  in economic or policy analysis. 
(IPCC 1994: p 216) 
This quotation is unclear on the extent to which 
GWPs can legitimately refer to the climatic response 
(as opposed to the more down-stream measure of 
potential damage referred to in the quote). The ambi- 
guity over forcing/response reflects uncertainty and 
changing knowledge amongst the climate change 
community (for example vis-a-vis equilibrium GCM 
runs around 1990). That the global mean temperature 
change at  the surface and troposphere is relatively 
independent of the forcing mechanism (i.e. a constant 
climate sensitivity) has been a commonly adopted 
heuristic within the climate modelling community. 
Fuglestvedt & Skodvin note that: 'This gives support to 
the application of radiative forcing as an appropriate 
index that could be  used to assess both the absolute 
and relative climatic impacts of changes in forcing' 
(1996: p 35). In a study published in 1994 Taylor & Pen- 
ner used a GCM, coupled to a n  atmospheric sulphur 
model, to analyse the effects of including an  increase 
in both sulphate aerosol and carbon dioxide concentra- 
tion upon radiative forcing (Taylor & Penner 1994). 
One plausible interpretation of this experiment was 
that the climate sensitivity may be different for gases 
which generate different patterns of horizontal and 
vertical radiative forcing (Wigley 1994). The ambiguity 
over the precise interpretation of GWPs accommodates 
the dominant scientific belief in a constant climate sen- 
sitivity, as well as the indeterminacy that it may turn 
o'ut to vary for different forcings. 
It is not surprising that users of GWPs have fre- 
quently regarded them as indicative of a climate 
change response. After all, they are termed Global 
Warming Potentials and it is difficult to see how they 
could be  sensibly advocated for policy use if they did 
not indicate some first-order response, even if the sci- 
entific basis for the relationship is not rigorously estab- 
lished. For example, a U S  government report from 
1991 compared GWPs to model calculations and stated 
that: 'The differences between the climate model ap- 
proach and the GWP calculation arise in part because 
the climate model approach calculated realized tem- 
perature change while the GWP calculated equilib- 
rium temperature change' (Task Force 1991: p 20; 
emphasis added), hence claiming that GWPs measure 
one feature of the response to forcing. 
There may have been contingent reasons to do with 
the US government's desire to establish a system 
within which permits for greenhouse gas emissions 
could be traded which help account for that particular 
interpretation of GWPs, likewise its optinlistic views 
about the ability of the index to cope with uncertainty 
and a rapidly changing knowledge-base, since any 
such policy would require at  a minimum a robust 
GWP-type index.' Without GWPs, the comprehensive 
approach would just not be feasible, and a 'carboncen- 
tric', command-and-control type regulatory regime 
would have become more credible, a politically un- 
acceptable alternative for the US g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~  In this 
political context, some ambiguity in the precise techni- 
cal meaning of GWPs serves an  important function, 
since it allows the implication to be made that the GWP 
is a measure of the response a s  well as of the forcing. 
This in turn lends support to that policy response-the 
comprehensive approach-which is most politically 
desirable. If GWPs were more strictly defined by tech- 
nical experts in policy contexts then they would lend 
less support to the comprehensive approach, and so 
support for GWPs would be less likely from advocates 
we are  suggesting that the policy preferences of the US gov- 
ernment influenced the technical appra~sa l  of the cornme- 
. A 
hensive approach-and this spilled over into ~ t s  representa- 
tion of GWPs. But this does not mean that the climate policy 
spec~alists within the administrat~on deliberately mis-repre- 
sented GWPs: rather that they used the flexibility in the tech- 
nical assessment of GWPs in their support. Evidence of the 
US government's optimistic outlook comes from various gov- 
ernment publications. A major report from 1991 stated that. 
'Although these uncertainties remaln In the GWP values, the 
consensus of the IPCC was that the scientific method of cal- 
culating GWPs is sufficiently sound to permit its use. Simi- 
larly, an  international workshop on GWP indices organised 
by NOAA. EPA, NASA. UKDOE, and others in Boulder. Col- 
orado, in November 1990, concluded that though these un- 
certainties require urgent attention, they do  not undermine 
the s c ~ e n t ~ f i c  fundamentals of the GWP index and do  not 
warrant abandoning it. . A good but imperfect index could 
serve well and then be amended later when knowledge im- 
proves' (Task Force 1991. p 23). This IS only one interpreta- 
tion of the Boulder meeting, however, slnce the official report 
can also be read a s  a detailed 1s t  of numerous uncertainties 
in the calculation and interpretation of GWPs (Workshop 
1991) 
6This is clear from a statement made by John Sununu, Presi- 
dent Bush's Chief of Staff from 1989 till 1992, in an  interview 
for Technology Review. 'There is a n  effort to focus only on 
carbon d ~ o x ~ d e  emissions, and I t h ~ n k  that's because carbon 
dioxlde is v~rtually a surrogate for economic growth and de -  
velopment. There's opposition to ~lnposing limits on a more 
comprehensive basis, because you don't slow growth and de -  
velopment down as  much by limiting emissions of other 
greenhouse gases like methane and nitrogen oxides' (Su- 
nunu 1992) 
98 Clim Res 8: 89-106, 1997 
of that policy. This political preference serves to illus- 
trate the significance of the flexible definition of GWPs 
in practical policy contexts. None of this is to suggest 
deliberate manipulation on the part of scientists or 
policy makers, however. At least one of the authors of 
the above-mentioned U S  government report knew 
well, for example, the difference between measures of 
forcing and of response. And yet the ambiguous state- 
ment appears in the report, not because of any con- 
spiracy to mislead policy makers, but because it was 
that scientific interpretation which most nearly dove- 
tailed with the surrounding policy ambitions in the US 
administration. 
The uncertainties and scientific debates surrounding 
GWPs are,  according to Victor, not generally recog- 
nised by the policy community and user groups who 
consider them to be key policy instruments (pers. 
comm. 23 July 1996), a point confirmed by evidence of 
how policy analysts from other fields have used GWPs 
uncritically (e.g. Wade et al. 1993).' The lack of knowl- 
edge amongst the policy community of the technical 
ambiguity of GWPs is likely to be important in sustain- 
ing their belief in GWPs, and indirectly perhaps also in 
some of the political programmes GWPs lend support 
to. In other words, if the ambiguity of GWPs were 
widely known about amongst the policy community it 
is likely that scepticism over their anticipated use 
would be greater and support for the comprehensive 
approach might be tempered with some reservations 
as to its practicality. The research and advisory scien- 
tists are themselves more aware of the ambiguity but 
not usually to the extent that is documented here 
because they tend to be working from a relatively 
restricted viewpoint (as discussed in the next section). 
They are also unaware of the role that ambiguity in the 
science plays in sustaining particular policy options, 
because they tend to perceive of science and policy as 
rather sharply d~stinct and 'stand-alone'. 
At a more general level, there is ambiguity concern- 
ing whether GWPs are primarily tools for policy of little 
use to scientists, as  Bert Bolin presented them at WGJ 
93, or whether, as other IPCC contributors have 
claimed, GWPs have stimulated research, and led to 
i.dentification of new priorities in, scientific work Most 
obviously, calculating GWPs required further develop- 
ment of models (e.g. for cycles of GHGs) which in turn 
raised questions for more basic research. One partici- 
pant commented that: 
7GWPs are also sometimes quoted In policy and discuss~on 
documents without specify~ny the tlme horizon used. Exam- 
ples Include a n  analysis from the US Department of State 
(1992) and a book on global environmental policy issues by 
a well-known political scientist (Skolnikoff 1993: p 182) 
In a sense requesting a GWP (for a particular gas] is 
giving a challenge to that particular reseclrch community. 
I mean, they didn't realise how important i t  was for them 
to understand the significance of the carbon cycle, and to 
determine the average lifetime of a CO, molecule. . So, 
for example, when you look at their models it is very clear 
that they are actually giving a different lifetime to normal 
CO:, than they attribute to the radioactive CO2 produced 
in the nuclear weapons test. And you say to them, 'well 
why is this?', and they say, 'well there are very good rea- 
sons why this I S ' ,  but they haven't actually worked them 
through. The two communities have just gone off, deal- 
ing with the same molecule but having different life- 
times, and there was no attempt for the two communities 
to get together. ... they realised that this meant they had 
to give a different lifetime to the CO, from deforestation 
than to the man-made COz. So they thought at that stage. 
we really should get to the bottom of this. 
(interview with S.S., atmospheric chemist, 5 April 1993) 
Hence GWPs may have unintentionally directed pol- 
icy for science by presenting new research questions 
and a concrete basis for interaction between re- 
searchers. The inconsistencies between the working 
assumptions and rules-of-thumb for different scientific 
sub-disciplines are highlighted by the needs of a fur- 
ther group representing policy makers-the IPCC. We 
can now add a fourth role for GWPs, that as  a heuristic 
device for pursuing further research questions. This 
multiplicity of roles constitutes further flexibility in the 
assessment criteria for evaluating GWPs. 
3.2. An interpretation of the role of ambiguity 
Rather than the 'multivalency' of GWPs being a 
source of weakness, it may facilitate the involvement 
of a range of interested parties in their further devel- 
opment and use, including scientists, policy makers 
and analysts, industry and environmental groups (cf. 
Singleton & Michael 1993). Several political scientists 
and sociologists have recently argued that loose co- 
alitions or alliances between a range of policy actors 
and knowledge-producers around a common under- 
standing of and orientation to, a problem and suitable 
solutions are  highly important in mobilising resources 
and effective policy actions to address those issues 
(Sabatier 1987, Haas 1989, 1992, Star & Greisemer 
1989, Hajer 1995). In this context, the ambiguity of 
GWPs is perhaps a resource for different scientific and 
policy actors to draw upon in developing and sustain- 
ing scientific and policy agendas. There are after all 
major questions and uncertainties surrounding how to 
further the FCCC, as a result of w h ~ c h  it is not possible 
for scientists or policy makers to know just how GWPs 
will be used in policy, hence exactly what is required of 
them. In such a situation, an ambiguous, hence flexi- 
ble, identity is possibly a useful resource since it pro- 
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vides the opportunity for fulf~lling different potential 
articulations of the relation of science and policy in the 
climate change domain, and satisfying different agen- 
das. An over-stabilisation of GWPs at  this stage, in 
terms of pinning down its precise meaning and use, 
could therefore risk it becoming over-brittle and con- 
straining to scientists and policy actors whose agendas 
and requirements for GWPs subsequently change. 
Such over-stabilised GWPs would be much less likely 
to be accepted by policy makers 
The ambiguity also works to the advantage of 
research scientists, in terms of providing them with a 
rationale for further research and interesting questions 
to address. If leading research scientists were not 
involved in developing GWPs, the scientific creden- 
tials of GWPs would surely be questioned. The 
demands of policy makers go only so far in explaining 
how and why research scientists undertake original 
work necessary to the formulation of GWPs (since the 
research community still has some autonomy, includ- 
ing its own peer-review processes). A further require- 
ment for an ambiguous identity for GWPs is, therefore, 
that it permits the pursuit of interesting basic research 
questions. For C-cycle, and other GHG-cycle, mod- 
ellers, for example, GWPs are  an  opportunity to pursue 
interesting research issues (e.g. why are the life-times 
of "C, I3C and I4C different?). 
The calculation of a new GWP for methane in 1993/4 
raised very basic research questions and cutting-edge 
atmospheric chemistry models were employed. Simi- 
larly, experts in radiative forcing and other aspects of 
atmospheric chemistry, as well as economists and 
other soclal scientists, can all pursue major new re- 
search questions through their involvement in devel- 
oping GWPs. Then there are the diverse research com- 
munities with an  interest in measuring and monitoring 
greenhouse gas emissions and in developing invento- 
ries, and/or who are adapting their research in the 
light of these new needs; this includes, amongst others, 
specialists in agricultural, animal husbandry and land- 
use practices, researchers in the energy field, air pollu- 
tion specialists, and so on. 
Meanwhile for advisory scientists at the IPCC, GWPs 
are a means of distilling a huge amount of scientific 
knowledge into a simple 'black-boxed' method for pol- 
icy makers. Each of the terms in the equation to calcu- 
late GWPs is a scientific judgement which draws upon 
vast areas of research. Chapter 5 of IPCC94 on GWPs 
is in many senses the summation and integration of the 
detailed knowledge in the 4 antecedent chapters into 
more policy-useful knowledge. GWPs therefore also 
provide some justification for the development and use 
of highly complex models: in particular, radiative mod- 
els, carbon-cycle and other GHG-cycle models and 
atmospheric chemistry models. It is highly important in 
the present context that science funded for policy rea- 
sons is seen to benefit policy makers. 
For policy makers, GWPs are  seemingly a cheap and 
accessible tool to devise 'optimal' climate change poli- 
cies. In principle, they permit involvement of a wider 
group of national experts than is typically the case 
when GCMs and carbon-cycle models are the princi- 
pal sources of knowledge. They promise to be useful 
tools to 'bridge' the gulf between the complexities of 
GCMs and policy issues arising from the FCCC, espe- 
cially the commitment to a comprehensive approach. 
At the same time, GWPs do not constrain the policy 
maker to the extent that 'control' is wrested away from 
them by scientists. 
The variable time-horizons for which GWPs can be 
calculated is also useful for policy makers. That it 
obscures the focus on a particular time period, system 
or region is a n  important way in which a global con- 
sensus on the impact or damage from climate change 
can emerge. At the same time, its potential incorpora- 
tion of many different time horizons permits scientists 
to take into account variable impacts on different time- 
scales. Imprecision here is a key resource, not a hin- 
drance. Variable time horizons in calculating GWPs 
might also permit greater flexibility for monitoring and 
presenting progress towards the achievement of seem- 
ingly rigid emission reduction  target^.^ 
This need for flexibility and ambiguity may also 
explain why the moves towards making GWPs more 
comprehensive have not been strongly supported by 
advisory scientists or indeed policy makers. A more 
complete index, whilst objectively more 'rational' and 
policy-relevant, may be  less desirable because it is 
more precisely defined a n d  less flexible a s  to how it 
can be interpreted and used (as well as opening up 
more opportunities for criticism, through the wider set 
of knowledges and uncertainties entailed in creating 
a more complete index). Although it may appear curi- 
ous that 'practical knowledge' is less specific and less 
useful in an  instrumental fashion, it is more under- 
standable when the multlple roles of knowledge in 
policy are recognised (cf. Stehr 1992). To have an  
effective interactional and  heuristic role, GWPs need 
to be flexible, whilst the symbolic role can still func- 
tion a s  long as  there is a low-level common definition. 
Our analytical approach, therefore, has been to iden- 
tify what each scientific or policy community involved 
'A counter-example is ODPs, which were integrated to 
steady-state. It has been suggested that their lack of varying 
time horizons was one reason why chlorine-loading poten- 
tials (CLPs) replaced ODPs as  the predominant comparative 
policy tool, hence suggesting the policy-s~gnificance of some 
open-endedness over the time-scale of analysis 
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in GWPs has to 'gain' from that involvement. The 
diversity of sought-for aims, ambitions and uses- 
from negotiators, government officials, advisory scien- 
tists, research scientists, environmentalists, and so 
forth-makes a flexible, ambiguous identity of GWPs 
a requisite feature. That flexibility cannot be infinite, 
however; there must be a 'lowest common denomina- 
tor' meaning given to GWPs across all the diverse 
groups involved in their construction and use if a rea- 
sonably coherent community is to emerge around 
GWPs. 
4. IMPLICIT SOCIAL AND POLICY 
COMMITMENTS INCLUDED IN DISCUSSIONS 
OVER THE POLICY USE OF GWPs 
In this section we explore how discussions between 
scientists and policy makers frequently include implicit 
social and policy assumptions, beliefs and commit- 
ments. In its 1994 report, the IPCC itself acknowledged 
the role of policy In constructing GWPs: 
A relative radlatlve forc~ng index is not purely a geo- 
physical quantity, such as is a change of temperature. 
Rather, these indices are user-oriented constructs whose 
calculation involves not only an understanding of a few 
relevant Earth-system processes (e.g., radiative transfer 
and chemical removal), but also some policy-oriented 
cho~ces (e.g., a selection of the time span of ~nterest).  
Hence, such indices per se are not subject to observation 
and testing in the sense of many climate-system predic- 
tions, but are best judged by ( i )  their representativeness 
of the overall radiative forcing role of the specified trace 
gas and (il) their overall usefulness to those who formu- 
late and establish pollc~es regarding the greenhouse 
gases. 
(IPCC 1994: p 212) 
The IPCC is referring in the above quote to deliber- 
ate choices made by policy actors, whereas here we 
are additionally alluding to implicit commitments and 
assumptions, which are not explicitly chosen through 
conscious debate. No one deliberately chose that 
GWPs would have an ambiguous identity, for example, 
or that they would have important symbolic and inter- 
actional roles. These features arose through social (and 
political) processes and negotiation, but are neverthe- 
less major elements in understanding the continued 
resilience of GWPs. We present several illustrative 
examples of implicit, and sometimes explicit, beliefs 
and commitments, drawing upon detailed observation 
by the first author of 3 IPCC Working Group I meetings 
[a planning meeting in February 1993 (WGI 93), a 
meeting of the lead authors in July 1994 [WGI 94A), 
and the Plenary of WGI held in September 1994 (WGI 
94B)l. 
4.1. Time horizons for GWPs: between flexibility and 
control 
Although WGI 93 endorsed the role and relevance of 
GWPs, there were a few dissenting voices. As one sci- 
entist (who we call scientist 1) put it in a note circulated 
at the meeting: 
We need to decide whether we wish to emphasise the 
clear and large contribution of CO,  (and CH,) to the 
historical greenhouse forclng or risk a protracted and 
difficult-to-resolve debate on the technicalities of GWP 
calculation Although we have presented three time 
horizons to cover these problems, my experience is that 
they tend to be misused or even abused. Industries tend 
to pick the horizon that puts thelr 'product' in the best 
light. 
Evidence to support scientist 1 emerged later that 
year in the UK following an advertisement, placed by 
the chemical company ICI, for Klea-134a, an HFC 
replacement of CFCs, in the House of Parliament's 
magazine The House. It claimed that the direct green- 
house warming of Klea is 90% less than the CFC it 
replaces (Greenpeace 1993). ICI failed to indicate the 
time horizon over which the direct GWP for Klea was 
calculated, this being 500 yr. If a shorter time horizon 
of 100 years was used Klea has a GWP which is 17 % of 
CFC-12, going up to 44 % if the time horizon is reduced 
to 20 years. The environmental group Greenpeace 
took the case to the UK's Advertising Standards 
Authority (ASA), who decided not to uphold this par- 
ticular complaint, arguing that: 
wh~le  the copy would have benefited from an explicit 
indication of the timescale used, readers would have 
viewed the claim in the context of long-term rather than 
short-term global warming and that ~t was therefore 
acceptable. 
(in Greenpeace 1993) 
Greenpeace responded to this by pointing out that 
the Climate Convention referred to limiting climate 
change over a time scale of decades rather than hun- 
dreds of years; they questioned the policy usefulness of 
a long time horizon for calculating GWPs, claiming 
that: '500 years is simply not a timescale that humans 
instinctively regard as useful' (ibid.). The ASA replled 
to Greenpeace that: 'the long term would seem to us to 
be equally important and we remain of the view that 
an unqualified claim will be interpreted as reflecting 
the long term situation' (ibid.). Many policy analysts 
and scientists who quote GWPs, however, now rou- 
tinely use the value as calculated over a 100 yr time- 
frame. In discussions at the WGI 93 meeting there was 
a consensus that the 500 yr horizon was far too long for 
calculating reliable GWPs-the idea was described by 
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one participant as 'ridiculous'; by contrast: 'we can 
produce a single set of numbers applicable to anything 
which might happen in the next 100 years'. The scien- 
tists at the IPCC in 1993/4 combined judgements about 
the scientific feasibility of calc.ulating reliable GWPs 
with judgements about what were policy-relevant time 
horizons, coming up with a 100 yr frame as probably 
most appropriate. 
The ICVGreenpeace example seems to support sci- 
entist l ' s  argument that the variable time horizons for 
calculating GWPs could become a recipe for endless, 
irresolvable and politically motivated arguments about 
what is a policy-useful time frame and what knowl- 
edge can be assumed on the part of policy makers. The 
abihty to use GWPs over different time frames and pre- 
sent them to other audiences as the same calculation 
could be seen as an  unwelcome feature of their flexi- 
bility which had not been fully appreciated by IPCC 
scientists when they introduced the time horizons. The 
3 time horizons, whilst according to the IPCC without 
'special significance', gained credence amongst out- 
siders as indicatives of the short, medium and long 
term. For example, 500 yr became, for the ASA, 'the 
long term'. 
One participant at  the WGI 93 meeting suggested 
that the policy use of GWPs would be helped by clearly 
labelling GWPs according to their time horizons, i.e. 
GWPlo would be a GWP calculated for 10 yr, GWPSOfor 
50 y r  and so on. The idea was rapidly taken up by the 
participants. If users could be persuaded to always 
label their GWPs in this way, and if that label were 
widely understood and even required as a matter of 
course, greater control by the IPCC over the conditions 
of use of GWPs could thereby be achieved. WGI's solu- 
tion implied a 'use/abuse' model of science in policy 
making; abuse which could be tackled by ~mposing a 
new mode of contl-01 which did not, however, detract 
from the essential simplicity, hence usefulness, of the 
concept. However, the idea vanished without comment 
or explanation at subsequent WGI meetings. A likely 
explanation is that such a level of control over GWPs 
would not have been welcomed by policy makers: 
because it would reduce their flexibility in the uptake 
and use of GWPs. 
4.2. Spatial and temporal variability of forcing 
concentrated in the industrial zones. The rejoinder to 
this, from scientist 3,  was that the sources of CFCs are 
about as regional as for sulphate, yet GWPs are calcu- 
lated for CFCs. 
Scientist 4 ,  in response to scientist 2 ,  noted that since 
CWPs aim to represent global damage,  the spatial or 
temporal variability of forcing was irrelevant. In other 
words, the forcing might be greater in some parts of the 
atmosphere than in others, but the climatic conse- 
quences would still be globally distributed. Scientist 2 
replied to this by pointing out that even if  you had the 
same GWP values for CO2 and sulphate, they would not 
necessarily compensate each other because the forcing 
varies spatially. Thus the compensation would be  
greater in the North Hemisphere than in the South with 
consequent differences in damage done, but consid- 
ered globally such differences would even out, giving a 
false indication of climatic change in terms of broad re- 
gional effects (and, given non-linearities, perhaps in its 
absolute extent). Scientist 5 then suggested that the 
word 'damage' should not be used by WGI at all since it 
'depends on where you live in the world' He  further 
thought that WGI 'should not get  into this at  all'. 
Discussion of the regional impacts and damages of 
climate change were directly invoked during WGI 93's 
debate over GWPs. But these debates did not lead to 
the conclusion that regional warming potentials should 
be calculated to assist policymaking in those circum- 
stances where global-scale assessment was not robust. 
The reason for this appears to have been the strong 
emphasis placed at  WGI 93 by the chairman of the 
IPCC WGI and  Bert Bolin (the overall chairman of the 
IPCC) on the definition of the enhanced greenhouse 
effect as a global-level problem, which requires 
global-level analysis and solutions. Rather than re- 
gional warming potentials, various solutions were 
suggested to maintain the global-scale focus of GWPs: 
for example, defining the spatial heterogeneity of 
sulphate-aerosol-induced climate change as  a policy 
issue rather than as science (even though heterogene- 
ity on the part of CFCs was not similarly treated as a 
policy issue); including additional uncertainty bounds 
because of the regional effects; and ruling out GWPs for 
short-lived or highly spatially variable gases. We sug- 
gest that the social and  policy commitment to global- 
level analysis was a prominent factor in the design and 
representation of GWPs a t  WGI of the lPCC, and con- 
tributed to the lack of discussion of alternative indices. 
4.3. A new GWP for methane 
A further issue discussed at  WGI 93 was whether 
GWPs could be calculated for gases which illustrate a 
high degree of regional variability (such as the CFCs) 
or for the sulphate aerosols, which have negative forc- 
ing as well as spatial and temporal heterogeneity. Sci- A new GWP for methane was suggested in IPCC94, 
entist 2 argued against including sulphate aerosols to take account of the effect of methane on its own life- 
because its sources are  far from global, being largely time and  its indirect effects. Calculation of this new 
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value was performed by 2 or 3 scientists using 3- 
dimensional atmospheric chemistry models (the only 
suitable ones available). Since the different models did 
not produce the same precise values for different 
direct and indirect effects, and  given that there was 
no obvious way of choosing one model result over 
another, the final values used, and the associated un- 
certainty ranges, were agreed through a process of 
negotiation between the modellers. 
At the subsequent Plenary Meeting-WGT 94B- 
when the Policy Makers Summary was officially 
endorsed by national representatives, one country's 
official raised the issue of how to represent the new 
GWP for methane. This official, who was a scientist, 
was concerned with the implications of the proposed 
presentation of the GWP for methane as a single figure 
(for a particular time horizon) with a n  uncertainty 
range of +35%. The danger, given the new GWP for 
methane, was that governments would be  tempted to 
trade-off reductions in CH4 for increases in other 
greenhouse gases, such as COz. The issue is illustrated 
well by Fuglestvedt & Skodvin (1996) who show that 
the total GHG emissions for New Zealand (as CO2 
equivalents) increase by 300 % when GWPs are  calcu- 
lated using a 20 yr rather than a 500 yr integration, 
whereas for Norway there is relatively little change 
(Fuglestvedt & Skodvin 1996: p 75-80). This is because 
methane is the dominant GHG for New Zealand for the 
20 yr time horizon, but if a 500 yr time horizon is used, 
CO2 dominates (and the contribution of methane is 
reduced from 75 '% to 28 9'0). 
The government official at  WGI 94B wanted a clearer 
statement of the wider uncertainties and some state- 
ment to the effect that there is too much uncertainty at- 
tached to GWPs for them to be  used to justify off-setting 
between greenhouse gases. The involvement at  this 
stage of government scientists from countries with par- 
ticular greenhouse gas emission patterns introduced 
new ideas about how uncertainty should be repre- 
sented, including whether there should be some indica- 
tion of the (in)appropriate policy use of GWPs. This sort 
of position is very similar to scientist l ' s  stance, dis- 
cussed above, in that it shares a sim.ilar perception of 
how science is typically open to abuse by self-inter- 
ested parties in policy making, i.e. its uncertainties will 
be treated as a resource in pursuing a political stance. 
Other influential scientists and policy makers at  WGI 
94B resisted changing the representation of uncer- 
tainty. They argued that it was not for the WGI to tell 
policy makers how to use GWPs and that this would 
appear a s  WGI claiming greater knowledge about pol- 
icy making than that held by the policy makers them- 
selves. Some mentioned the analogy of Ozone Deple- 
tion Potentials (ODPs), and in the 1994 report this 
comparison was developed a t  some length in a section 
entitled 'The Insights Gained From Ozone Depleting 
Potentials'. There it states that: 'The Legal Drafting 
Group that wrote the final text of the Protocol required 
that single values be stated for the ODPs, despite the 
fact that a scientific estimate always has some level of 
uncertainty and hence a numerical range within which 
the ODP is ltkely to he' (IPCC 1994: p 228). 
The WGI's expliclt comparison with ODPs is instruc- 
tive given the considerable overlap between advisory 
scientists on the WMO's ozone assessment panel and 
the IPCC WGI. It reveals much about the way in which 
these advisory scientists conceived of their relationship 
to policy. For example, that advisory scientists acceded 
to the policy makers' request for a single ODP value, 
whilst an  understandable response, could nevertheless 
be seen as misleading from a scientific perspective. 
The advisory scientists' own extrapolation from the 
ozone to the climate change case of what policy mak- 
ers a re  likely to 'need' by way of knowledge may also 
come to have a decisive influence on policy makers' 
own perceptions of what knowledge they need and 
can reasonably expect. That is, policy makers may 
legitimately conclude from the presentation of a single 
value by advisory scientists that they do not need to 
grapple with the issue of scientific uncertainty as 
expressed in a range of values. 
The case of the GWP for methane indicates the fuzzy 
character of the boundary between science and policy. 
How policy makers defined science and policy in the 
related case of ODPs was used by advisory scientists as 
a guide to distinguish science from policy in the case of 
GWPs. This is a n  understandable response, but never- 
theless reinforces uncritically the idea that policy mak- 
ers are  unable to cope with more than a modicum of 
scientific uncertainty, and will not accept a range of 
figures. Such models of policy are  rarely traceable to 
specific policy makers or policy commitments, but 
seem more the result of shared assumptions or implicit 
commitments of the proto-community of climate 
change policymaking, to which advisory scientists 
have become wedded. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
GWPs have a flexible, ambiguous meaning which 
assists in their continued development through nurtur- 
ing interactions between research and advisory scien- 
tists, policy makers, environmentalists, industrialists 
and other interested parties. We have identified 4 roles 
for GWPs-instrumental, symbolic, heuristic and 
interactional-which contribute to the maintenance of 
a flexible interpretation and meaning. Th.e way GWPs 
are  discussed tends to incorporate assumptions about 
the social and policy context of their expected use.g 
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Even the 'lowest common denominator' identity 
implies belief in analysing and tackling global warm- 
ing, through GHG emission reductions, at  the global 
level (and despite technical and policy arguments for a 
regional analysis and policy response). The commit- 
ment on the part of many advisory sc~entists to a global 
analysis and solution appears to be motivated by 2 con- 
siderations: firstly, the perceived tendency for interna- 
tional policy to become reduced to a contest between 
national interests, and secondly, by the belief that 
nations will try and avoid their obligations whilst ben- 
efiting from the actions of others. (Any one nation 
stands to gain little, in terms of limiting climate change 
in its own region, from participating in greenhouse gas 
emission reductions, whilst gaining much from the 
actions of other nations.) Only a global solution, entail- 
ing global-scale analysis and policy development, will, 
it is felt, overcome these parochial influences. But the 
global focus is also founded, we suggest, on the techni- 
cal judgement that a n  index at the global scale is more 
robust and 'do-able' than a regional one. In a sense, 
the policy and technical definitions of the problem and 
viable solutions converge at  the global-scale locus. 
The discussions at  IPCC meetings illustrated 2 other 
substantive beliefs about policy. Firstly, in the ability of 
the policy system to prevent misuse of the GWP con- 
cept from politically driven interest groups. This judge- 
ment was arrived at by 'default', as an assumption of 
the authoritative influence of science. Secondly, that 
advisory scientists should use the policy makers' own 
distinctions between science and policy when demar- 
cating the limits of their expertise (though we have 
observed this in only one case). We are not criticising 
these beliefs about policy per se. Our point is more 
about the processes through which such beliefs 
emerge and are sustained. They are  not judgements 
which are openly debated amongst a wide section of 
policy actors, but are instead assumed without much 
evidence of critical reflection by advisory scientists and 
some policy makers. (This is not to deny the consider- 
able personal experience the latter groups bring to the 
IPCC, but rather an  acknowledgement that this does 
not guarantee a sufficiently wide-ranging discussion.) 
And unexpected consequences flow from these judge- 
ments: for example policy makers may take their cue 
for locating the science/policy boundary from advisory 
"ictor has analysed in depth the political and administrative 
conditions which would need to be in place for GWPs to be 
used effechvely in climate policy maklng. He has found these 
conditions to be far removed from the current situation (Vic- 
tor 1990, 1991, Grubb e t  al. 1991, Victor & Salt 1995a, b). 
Hence his analysis complements ours by illuminating addi- 
tional presumptions about the social and policy context in 
which GWPs will be used which a re  rarely acknowledged or 
critically assessed 
scientists, not realising that the scientists have them- 
selves borrowed the policy makers own perceived dis- 
tinction between science and policy (as expressed 
informally and in other policy fora). The scientists may 
thereby unintentionally reinforce the distinction be- 
tween science and policy made by pol~cy makers. 
Because the science/policy boundary IS always fuzzy, 
and subject to negotiation, uncritically reinforcing the 
prior assumption of policy makers runs the risk of c.ur- 
tailing creative thinking. Other lmpllcations in this 
vein are  presented in Box 1. 
The focus on GWPs a t  the science-policy interface 
has reinforced GHG emission reductions as the prime 
means of analysing and responding to climate change. 
As Victor & Salt have put it: 
Op t~ons  for dealing with multiple gases without using the 
GWP concept have not been adequately reflected in the 
internat~onal debate because analysts have focused on 
the easlest measures (i.e. emissions) and then been 
forced to adopt some sort of conversion index (i.e. the 
GWP, usually with 100 year integration). With so much 
now invested in emissions-oriented thinking and policy 
analysis, it would be painful for many to explore the 
severe problems with the GWP concept, which would 
require rethinking of the entire approach to slowing 
global warming. 
(Victor & Salt 1995b: p 34) 
To put it another way: (1) GWPs are perceived as 
more stable and robust by many policy actors than is 
the specialist scientific perception; (2) partly as a con- 
sequence GWPs are  increasingly accepted as the most 
appropriate tool for comparing different GHGs in the 
context of the FCCC; (3) this approach to GWPs tends 
to reinforce a n  emphasis on emissions as the appropri- 
a te  indicator by which to establish and define policy 
commitments. A significant influence in this case 
appears to have been the perceived need of the main 
actors within the climate policy domain to reach an  
agreement rather rapidly on how to codify new (i.e. 
post year 2000) commitments under the FCCC. GWPs 
are  one of the crutches which support the development 
of the FCCC in the manner preferred by the dominant 
policy actors, whilst acquiring support themselves from 
this important policy role. 
Alternative definitions of policy responses are  avail- 
able, including: calculating relative radiative forcing 
and codifying commitments in terms of allowable con- 
tributions over a particular period of time to global 
radiative forcing; producing economic welfare based 
indices; calculating equal financial shares towards 
solving a common burden; and according a greater 
role to deliberate adaptation (Victor pers. comm. 23 
July 1996). It could even be  argued that a single, stan- 
dardised metric of global applicability such as  the 
GWP might come to inhibit nationally, regionally or 
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~ Box 1. Some implications for climate change science and policy arising from the GWPs case-study 
1 (1) Mutual reinforcement processes between science 
and policy tend to make certain opt~ons look more solidly 
grounded in scientific analysis than is the case. Vigilance 
is needed to ensure that premature closure of policy 
options / modes of scientific analysis does not occur. 
Recognition and discussion of the ambiguity and multiva- 
lency of scientific tools for policy in the public domain is 
one way to stimulate debate which explores options other 
than the dominant response 
(2) In some cases, scientific tools for policy cannot 
become too specific and precise, yet still remain robust in 
advisory and policy circles, because they would lose 
much of their ability to interlink different research and 
policy communities. Arguably, global climate change 
policy is currently as much about forging new linkages 
between previously disparate groups, mstitutions, knowl- 
edges and techniques as it as about actual policy actions 
being decided and acted-upon now (i.e. inter- 
actional/symbolic rather than instrumental rationality). 
Such loose coalitions are critical in facilitating the wider 
acknowledgement and diffusion of the issue and build- 
ing-up of trust and appropriate knowledge. Indices or 
locally focused policy actions, or else actions focused 
on different time horizons than the ones preferred in 
calculating GWPs. Alternative indices may therefore 
need to be more specifically tailored to a particular 
context of policy use. 
Amongst research and advisory scientists the ambi- 
guity of GWPs is more widely recognised, though most 
scientists are familiar with only some of those aspects 
mentioned in this paper since they are  typically inter- 
ested in only part of the technical knowledge under- 
pinning GWPs. Less familiar to scientists is the notion 
that science for policy may contain implicit social and 
policy beliefs, and that the preference for a particular 
policy option may be founded in part on a misplaced 
confidence on the part of decision makers in the 
underpinning science. Some scientists are  likely to 
resist this notion since it may appear (falsely) as a chal- 
lenge to the autonomy or integrity of science, though 
all we are attempting to do is to promote a discussion 
on what are appropriate and effective roles for science 
in policy. Ambiguity is commonly perceived by scien- 
tists as uncertainty which needs to be addressed by 
further research. They therefore tend to locate ambi- 
guity within their own specific research domain as 
their 'responsibility'. Ambiguity provides material for 
further research in the problem-solving mode. For this 
reason, scientists are unlikely to widely publicise to 
policy makers the uncertainty and ambiguity over 
GWPs which emerges in their own specific domain. 
This allows the key advisory scientists and/or climate 
policy specialists-who mediate between the research 
community and policy makers-to connect the per- 
ceived needs of policy (themselves uncertain) with that 
other tools for policy cannot be assessed therefore only in 
instrumental terms (i .e.  concerning whether the particu- 
lar numerical values are rel~able and useful in specific 
policy contexts). Uncertainty and instability in numerical 
values, or incompleteness, are then less significant in 
evaluating the usefulness of such a policy tool than is 
typically assumed. 
(3) For this reason, an index or tool for policy which is 
more comprehensive in the sense of including more 
'down-stream' variables will not necessarily be more 
acceptable or effective at the science-policy interface. 
Consensus may be easier to achieve for a scientific policy 
tool which is less ambitious and leaves more policy choices 
open to future debate.'' 
( 4 )  As GWPs (and other tools) become used in specific, 
practical policy-making contexts, greater emphas~s will 
probably be placed on instrumental utility with respect to 
the policy context of use. At some stage, the ambiguity in 
identity and interpretation may be insufficient to contain 
all the versions developed for detailed application, at 
which point break-away ind~ces or integrated assessments 
are probable. 
definition of GWPs which seems most relevant to those 
needs, the result being that the science and policy 
dovetail snugly into one another. The specialist advi- 
sors are, quite reasonably, using the flexibility in the 
scientific definition of GWPs to find the most appropri- 
ate role for science given signals from policy makers 
and politicians on the characteristics of a desirable pol- 
icy framework. In doing so, however, policy makers 
might come to exaggerate the overall instrumental role 
of science and/or of the feasibility of certain policy 
approaches (e.g. the comprehensive approach). 
GWPs are typically represented in IPCC reports as 
science-based, objective, stable and value-neutral. 
Their technical use in generating numbers directly 
useful for policy is regarded as the end point of suc- 
cess, with little mention of the scientific, policy, politi- 
cal and administrative conditions influencing the use- 
fulness and uptake of GWPs." This presentation does 
not assist in the development of robust climate change 
science or policy because it does not reflect the real- 
world debates between scientists and policy actors 
concerning the development of a method for compar- 
ing greenhouse gases and how this could be used in 
''Some confirming evidence includes: the preferred use of 
CLPs rather than ODPs in the policy assessment of ozone 
depletion, this being a more up-stream measure around 
wh~ch scientific consensus was more readily achieved; and 
the counter-example of the World Resource Institute's 
Greenhouse Index which was almost universally regarded 
negatively because of its needed inclusion of relatively 
down-stream policy and political ludgements about how to 
allocate responsibility for GHG emissions, though in a less 
than fully transparent way (Hammond et al. 1990, 1991, 
Agarwal& Narain 1991, Overview 1991a, b) 
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implementing the FCCC, nor the non-obvious but 
important roles that GWPs come to play in policy 
debates. It is our contention that were the ambiguity, 
instability, multiple roles, controversy over, and hybrid 
features of GWPs more widely known, a better overall 
role for them in climate change policy would emerge. 
More generally, recognition of the multiple roles of sci- 
ence in policy may encourage reflection by advisory 
scientists and policy makers on the reasons why partic- 
ular sorts of knowledge come to be important at the 
science-policy interface and under what circum- 
stances, and hence permit a better overall assessment, 
development and application of such knowledge. The 
next step is to further discuss what alternatives are 
available or could be developed with respect to scien- 
tific tools for policy, policy commitments and ways of 
thinking. A related point, emerging from the role of 
science in nurturing new communities, is to consider 
how the social and policy coalitions centred around cli- 
mate change might become more socially inclusive 
and mobilise more political weight. 
CODA 
As we were revising this paper, we received a draft 
copy of a paper by Steven Smith and Tom Wigley (dated 
16 July 1996) in which the results of GWPs are  directly 
compared with comparable calculations using a l - D  
climate model. They find that: ' ..the use of GWPs can re- 
sult in large and potentially serious errors, and we con- 
clude that GWPs should not be used for policy analysis'. 
In the view of one of the scientists who developed GWPs, 
the Smith/Wigley paper 'nicely brings an end to the 
GWP saga'. As a result, scientific judgement may swing 
away from GWPs rather dramatically. It is fascinating to 
note that this rigorous validation task for GWPs has only 
been conducted in 1996, more than 6 yr after GWPs be- 
"The low-level. singular definition of GWPs is dependent on 
the existence of multiple, diverse definitions. GWPs would 
rapidly lose all credibility as scientific or useful for policy 
were the separate ambitions and work of the range of scien- 
tists, advisory scientists and policy makers to be overly con- 
strained by a narrow definition of the GWP. Meanwhile, 
without the single, reduced version, the range of activities 
undertaken under the GWPs banner would lose much 
meaning and there would be no similar currency for inter- 
national policy and scientific discussions on how to compare 
GHGs (especially when planning the future trajectory of re- 
search and policy). The presentation of certain, quantitative 
GWPs in formal reports such as the IPCC's, whilst greatly 
reducing and simplifying the scientific complexities and as- 
sumptions, is acceptable to scientists only because of the ex- 
istence of an informal further level of understanding and ne- 
gotiation between scientists and policy makers on the 
interpretation of the way in which scientific knowledge is 
used for specific policy decisions 
gan to be promoted. Some government departments 
even requested scientists to conduct similar validation 
exercises back in 1990. That this was not done is ex- 
plained, according to one advisory scientist, by the fact 
that the research scientists were so busy developing and 
calculating new GWP values that they did not have time 
to conduct proper validations tests for GWPs. If  a correct 
interpretation, this is a vivid illustration of how perceived 
policy pressures and needs come to construct scientific 
tools in a way which closes down reflexive debate and 
thorough validation. And note how this preoccupation of 
scientists with developing GWPs, rather than in their val- 
idation, could very easily be  interpreted by policy mak- 
ers as evidence that GWPs have already been properly 
validated and hence that climate policy can be  devel- 
oped in the confident knowledge that a robust tool exists 
for comparing different GHGs. Pending further evi- 
dence, this is a n  excellent and  revealing illustration of 
the mutual reinforcement of climate change science and 
policy in the case of GWPs, which informs the theoretical 
component of this paper. 
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